Lord GEORGE ROBERTSON NATO Genel Sekreteri NATO Secretary General Turkey And A European Security and Defence Identity Albert EINSTEIN once said that the most pleasing activity is to chop wood, because you can immediately see the result of your work! Security policy, by contrast, is a long-term affair, and often the results of our decisions reveal themselves only months or years later. Building a European Security and Defence Identity is a case in point. It is a process that takes many years to develop. So we have to make sure the decisions we take are the right ones. And, we are making the right decisions. However, I am aware that in Turkey my optimism might not be shared entirely. Some in Turkey fear that the current evolution of ESDI might marginalise the country. I understand even if I do not share the cause for these concerns. Turkey is a member of NATO, but not yet of the EU. Until now, through its NATO membership, Turkey, together with all other Allies, was at the centre of European security management. Now, as the EU aspires to become a true security actor in its own right, NATO will no longer be the only institution managing security in Europe. The EU is taking over many of the functions of the WEU, and some see that as calling into question the benefits of Turkey's far-reaching Associate status in the WEU. These recent developments suggest to some people that Turkey is suffering a "minus" in its security status -- and a net loss in its influence on the evolution of European security. These are serious concerns and they are being taken seriously. That is all the more so as Turkey shares its status with the other five non-EU European Allies -- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, and Poland -- and, to a different extent, also with Canada. As a consequence of all this some are tempted to dismiss the entire project of European Defence as unwelcome. After all, NATO is in good shape, so why introduce such far-reaching policy changes? Isn't there value in the saying that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"? In my view such an attitude would be mistaken. First, because, the concerns of non-EU Allies are being taken seriously and addressed. But secondly and perhaps more importantly, because the status quo has become untenable. Indeed, "if it ain't broke, it may be broken soon". The recent burden-sharing debates in the US Presidential campaign were just one of many signs that building a stronger European role in security matters has become necessary to a healthy transatlantic relationship. That is why we should support the creation of a European Security and Defence identity. If you look at the evolution of our security arrangements from an historical perspective, the notion of giving the EU a security dimension appears neither revolutionary nor naïve. On the contrary, a sober analysis of the issues clearly shows that the evolution towards a stronger EU role was inevitable. NATO and the EU both emerged from the specific circumstances of post-war Europe. But despite their similar geographic origins, and despite a certain overlap in their memberships, these two institutions could hardly have been more different: regarding their goals, their legal frameworks, their tasks, their working methods -- and indeed their institutional "philosophies". NATO was an Alliance of sovereign states, cooperating exclusively on security matters. The European Union process, by contrast, acquired an agenda that covered almost everything but security. During the Cold War, these two institutions complemented each other perfectly. NATO provided security for its members, and thus also provided an umbrella for European development. And the European Union could focus on more promising areas than security. But both institutions had their deficiencies. In NATO, the military capabilities of the Allies were distributed unevenly -- the United States was both outspending and outperforming most other Allies. In the EU, it was the lack of a security dimension. Both institutions made repeated attempts to rectify these deficiencies. But as long as there was a common existential threat, it simply made sense to keep the arrangements as they were. And so we engaged in rituals rather than in a real change of policy: the United States would ritually scoff at the Europeans for not spending more on defence but everybody knew that the US had no alternative but to be the mainstay. In a similar vein, the Europeans would ritually chafe under what they perceived as US dominance -- and yet at the end of the day, all their rhetoric about strengthening Europe's security dimension rang hollow. Again, with dozens of Soviet tank divisions pointing westward, what value would such a specific European security dimension have added? Only North America and Europe together could have mastered such a challenge -- and that gave NATO its raison d'être. Today, however, the Cold War and the Soviet Union are gone. There is no longer an existential threat that helps hide institutional deficiencies. On the contrary, the post-Cold War world has exposed these deficiencies -- and rather mercilessly. The lack of a European security dimension was painfully demonstrated in the early phase of the Bosnian war. The United States argued that they "didn't have a dog in this fight", and stayed out. But no European security policy was there to fill the void. Some Europeans may have boasted that this was the "hour of Europe", -- but they were premature. Eventually, the US realised it did have a stake in stopping the war in Bosnia, and together Europe and North America made the difference between war and peace. In this sense, our successful engagement in Bosnia was a crucial lesson on the value of transatlantic solidarity. But this was not the only lesson. The writing was on the wall for everyone to read: not every regional conflict would necessarily engage the strategic interests of the United States the same way as that of the Europeans. So the second lesson was that from now on we had to contemplate scenarios where the United States would not want to be in the lead. In such a case, then, the Europeans had better be able to provide some leadership themselves. If Bosnia reinforced the logic of the European Allies doing more politically, Kosovo reinforced the urgency of the European Allies doing more militarily. Not only did the United States carry a disproportionate share of the burden of the air campaign. The campaign also showed that in such a new scenario, the gap in US and Allied capabilities figured even more prominently than in the scenarios of the Cold War. As a global power, the US had always invested in power projection capabilities. In the Kosovo campaign, these capabilities came in very handy. European armed forces, by contrast, are still largely geared to the specific scenarios of the Cold War. They would have made a significant contribution to our collective defence in case of an attack from the East. But, to put it bluntly, in an air campaign against a small-scale Balkan dictator no tank formations are required. Europeans had a lot of capabilities they didn't need, and too few of the capabilities they did need. In the end, as in Bosnia, transatlantic solidarity prevailed again. But our success came at a price: there was lingering American dissatisfaction about an unfair division of labour. I recall a US Senator telling me on Capitol Hill that his constituents were increasingly fed up as the Europeans came to "knock on Uncle Sam's door" when there was trouble in Europe. And on top of that there was European dissatisfaction about having too little political say. The British author Samuel JOHNSON once said that the thought of being hanged in a fortnight concentrates the mind wonderfully. Bosnia and Kosovo did concentrate our minds wonderfully and they still do. These crises demonstrated the urgency of rectifying the deficiencies of our institutional and military landscape. They demonstrated all too well that the solution could only lie in a stronger security role by the Europeans and especially by their most integrated entity the European Union. Of course, we had the Western European Union. In the immediate post-Cold War days, this organisation served as a convenient venue for our attempts to shift more responsibility to the European Allies. As a bridge between NATO and the EU, the WEU helped us get around the different memberships of NATO and EU. Its flexible nature allowed for a creative mix of "full members", "associate members" -- such as Turkey -- and "observers". This allowed us to make real progress on many thorny issues. We agreed on procedures for NATO-WEU information-sharing, we negotiated arrangements for the WEU's use of NATO assets, we clarified the role of the Deputy SACEUR as the point man between NATO and the WEU for WEU-led operations, and we held exercises together. These were, and continue to be, precious achievements. But even as we pushed for closer NATO-WEU relations, we always knew that we had to aim higher. The WEU was simply too narrow -- and bluntly too powerless -- to bear the full traffic of European crisis management. That was clear to most observers. It became obvious that if there was to be a serious approach to European-led crisis management, the lead role had to go to the European Union. Since Maastricht the 15 nation-European Union had aspired to develop a distinct security dimension. While some argued that, initially, this involved slightly more rhetoric than substance, those who observe the European process know that there was an inevitability in the extension of the EU into security and defence policy. It was increasingly obvious that even the revived WEU was a transitory, and none too effective, framework. It would not be around forever. Eventually, another chapter would open -- the chapter in which the EU itself finally got serious about security and defence. Since the Declaration from the British-French Summit in St. Malo that new chapter has opened - a chapter entitled the European Security and Defence Policy. It should be possible now for this ESDP to finally rectify the deficiencies that have plagued both NATO and the EU for years: the asymmetry in the military capabilities between the US and Europe, and the lack of an effective and workable European crisis management role in cases where NATO as a whole was not engaged. At the EU's Helsinki Summit last December, ambitious goals were set. First, the establishment of a Political and Security Committee to provide advice to EU leaders on security issues, as well as day-to-day political leadership of EU-led operations. Second, the creation of a Military Committee and staff to provide military advice to the Political and Security Committee, and to carry out their directions during potential operations. However, going beyond at last the purely institutional measures, the EU set itself an ambitious "Headline Goal" of creating, by 2003, the means to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days, sustainable in theatre for at least one year. The EU has also identified the forces and capabilities its members have to commit in order to meet their collective "Headline Goal". This was a first and a very big first indeed. This decision is the visible evidence that the EU is willing to go beyond new institutional mechanisms, and will also muster the military capabilities to underpin them. At last the Europeans will have military capabilities connected to a European crisis- management structure. The challenge now is to translate these ambitious goals into practice. And it is here where NATO comes into play. After all, only in close cooperation with NATO can such a European option be developed successfully. Why? Because NATO is Europe's dominant security institution. Bosnia and Kosovo have made that utterly clear. NATO remains absolutely vital as the cornerstone of European security -- in peacekeeping, in defence diplomacy, as a framework for cooperation, and, if necessary, for collective defence. During its half century of existence, it has accumulated a high and unprecedented level of expertise. Moreover, the US retains key strategic capabilities which will be indispensable for all but the smallest European contingencies: logistics, strategic lift, satellite reconnaissance etc. Even if NATO may not be in the lead, its support might well make the difference between success and failure. This fundamental fact alone should take some of the drama out of ESDP. It reinforces the point we have been making all along: ESDP is not about European strategic independence, but about a more coherent European contribution to crisis management. It is not about the EU somehow going it alone -- it is about Europe doing more. Because we have kept these fundamentals in mind, NATO and the EU have been able to move ahead quickly. We now have an agreement on sharing classified documents, so NATO and the EU can work together on practical issues. We have also set up several NATO-EU Ad Hoc Working Groups to examine how NATO could support the EU operationally when Europe takes the lead in handling crises. And the NATO Council has held two meetings so far with the EU's Interim Political and Security Committee. This gives you an indication of how much importance both sides of the Atlantic attach to this project. And of how much we want it to succeed. What are the current challenges? One is to create effective institutional links between NATO and the EU. These institutional links are important with respect to consultation in a crisis. But they are also important in the area of force planning. After all, each country in NATO and the EU has only one set of forces and one defence budget. So NATO and EU defence planning must be coherent to avoid duplication and to ensure that our forces are structured and equipped to conduct the full range of missions they might be assigned. A similar requirement applies to operations. As the EU plans for operations, it must be open and transparent to NATO. This will allow non-EU Allies to contribute, where possible, to the planning of the operation, and it will facilitate the participation of non-EU Allies in the operation itself. Another key challenge is capabilities. The seriousness of ESDP will be judged largely by the extent to which it contributes to the strengthening of European military muscle. With the Headline Goal, Europe has set itself a realistic, achievable target -- but it is still pretty ambitious. To meet it, significant improvements will have to be made to Europe's military capabilities in a range of areas -- from training, to recruitment, to procurement. To some extent, these challenges can be met by getting a better return on investment -- through innovative management techniques, identification of priorities professionalising, downsizing, and more transnational cooperation. But let me be very clear. Spending more wisely will get you only so far. In the end, EU nations must also "bite the bullet" and spend more. And, as you know, I have been reminding all allies of that. I won't let them off the hook. Finally, -- and very importantly to more than just Turkey is -- the question of the participation of non-EU Allies. Why does NATO put so much emphasis on this question? I think the case of Turkey demonstrates quite convincingly why. There is both a political and a military imperative why non-EU NATO Allies such as Turkey simply must be part of the game. First, the political point. It is a very simple and straightforward point: we all need Turkey. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey at the centre of a vital strategic area. Indeed, I would argue that, as a secular democracy and a staunch NATO Ally, Turkey has never had a greater opportunity to play a role as an agent of positive change. All Allies, North American or European, NATO or EU, appreciate that. Any attempt to deprive Turkey of this unique role, any misguided attempt to marginalise her, would be self-defeating especially if a crisis affects Turkey's security or Turkey's vital interests. If this was attempted, the West would act against its own vital strategic interests. That is why Turkey must remain a crucial part of the European security equation. The second point is a military one. Even a quick glance at a list of conceivable scenarios for EU-led crisis management operations drives the conclusion that virtually all these scenarios involve Turkey, in one way or another. Simply put: if the crisis is very serious, NATO will be involved -- and that includes Turkey. If the crisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, but only with the help of NATO. Again, Turkey will also be involved. If the crisis is at the lower end of the spectrum, the EU may act autonomously but will want to take into account eventual contributions by Turkey. In any case, Turkey needs to be involved -- because NATO assets are required, because Turkish contributions are needed, or because the operation takes place in a region close to Turkey. In other words, the military realities of crisis management will ensure that Turkey will play a role commensurate with its weight as a major security actor. In light of these political and military reasons it becomes clear why we, in our dealings with the EU, have been playing the role of advocate for the non-EU Allies on the participation issue. I am confident that the EU is now proposing arrangements with the non-EU European Allies, including Turkey, that will meet their security interests. Indeed, things are moving fast. Over the last few weeks, the EU Presidency has made a major effort to accommodate the concerns of non-EU Allies, and this has moved the debate considerably forward. Let me outline, briefly and bluntly, the "success" tally of the 6 non-EU NATO nations. I believe it is formidable. In peace-time first, Permanent and regular consultation is assured through meetings at all levels from Ministers to experts. The 6 non-EU European Allies can themselves propose meetings and agendas. The scope of subjects to be discussed covers the full range of security, defence and crisis management. Liaison officers can be appointed by the 6 to the EU military staff. Others specific liaison arrangements can be organised, in particular for exercises. The force offers made by the 6 non-EU European Allies at the Capabilities Commitments Conference are very welcome additions to the EU Headline Goal and will be treated in the same way as the force offers of EU member states in the follow up to the Conference. These peace-time arrangements will be reinforced in times of crises. During the pre-operational phase of a crisis, Consultations will be intensified at all levels, including Ministerial. These consultations will in particular cover concerns of the 6 non-EU European Allies relating to their security interests. They will ensure that these countries are kept abreast of EU thinking on strategic military options, the concept of operations (which will only be adopted after taking into consideration the consultations with these countries), and the operational plan. During the operational phase of a crisis, European members of NATO will have an automatic right to participate in EU operations where NATO assets are used. They can also be invited to participate in operations where there is no recourse to NATO assets. All troop contributors will have the same rights and obligations in the Committee of Contributors, which will be responsible for and will play a crucial role in the day-to-day conduct of the operation. A stronger European role in crisis management is inevitable. It is a logical step in the process of European construction. But it is also of crucial importance for the Alliance itself. For it is a prerequisite for a more balanced, fairer, transatlantic relationship. That is why all NATO Allies have supported the development of a stronger European role in security and defence. And we all have a strong interest in seeing this project succeed. It is after all the most momentous rebalancing of NATO since it was founded in 1949 - 51 years ago. To the degree that this involves turning the EU along with its partners in Europe into a serious security actor, many adjustments will have to be made. The EU, after all, is a "newcomer" to the complex field of "hard" security. But these adjustments can succeed, provided they are developed in a spirit of compromise. I believe this spirit is clearly visible, and it goes beyond security matters. In his recent book on Turkey, "Turkish challenge", Ambassador ÖYMEN, who is the next speaker here today, characterised Turkey as the EU's "distant relative". It is my impression that this distance is narrowing. The EU's Helsinki Summit not only made decisions with regard to security. It also elevated Turkey's status to a candidate for EU membership. Ambassador ÖYMEN's book also familiarised me with a saying by Kemal ATATÜRK in which he exhorted the Turkish people to "trust themselves". This is as true today as it has ever been. Turkey has every reason to trust itself. It has no reason at all to fear ESDI, ESDP, or any other acronyms created to define Europe's defence role. Turkey was, is and will remain a major player in the European security equation. And so it should. LORD ROBERTSON: "TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA KİMLİĞİ" Türkiye NATO'ya üye, ama henüz bir AB üyesi değil. Ve bir Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma kimliğinin kurulmasıyla, NATO artık Avrupa'nın güvenliğini yöneten tek kurum olmayacak. Bu durum Türkiye'nin güvenliğinin zayıflayacağı izlenimini uyandırabilir. Bu endişe ciddiye alınacaktır ama bence bu izlenim yanlıştır. NATO ve AB soğuk harp sırasında birbirlerini çok iyi tamamladılar. Sovyetler Birliği dağıldı. Her iki kurumun da bazı eksiklikleri ortaya çıktı. NATO'da, Müttefikler arasındaki askeri kapasite dağılımı dengesizdi. ABD'nin performans ve harcamaları ise müttefiklerinkinden çoğunlukla daha yüksekti. AB'deki güvenlik eksikliği, Bosna savaşının ilk evrelerinde acı bir şekilde belirginleşti. ABD'nin stratejik çıkarlarının tüm bölgesel çatışmalarda Avrupa'nınki kadar etkilenmeyebileceği ortaya çıktı. St. Malo Zirvesi, bir Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasını gündeme getirdi. AB, 2003'e kadar, 60.000 birliği 60 günde toplayarak, en az bir yıl cephede tutabilecek kapasiteye erişmeyi hedefledi. Ve bu hedeflere erişmek için NATO'nun işbirliği gerekmekte. NATO ise, AB üyesi olmayan ortaklarının bu savunmaya katılmasına çok önem veriyor. Türkiye'nin durumunun da kesinlikle kanıtladığı gibi, Türkiye gibi NATO üyelerinin bu oyunun bir parçası olmaları, siyasi ve askeri açıdan mutlak bir zorunluluk. Büyükelçi ÖYMEN'in kitabında ATATÜRK'ün Türklerden kendilerine güvenmelerini istediğini okudum. Türkiye'nin bugün de kendisine güvenmesi için güçlü nedenleri var. Türkiye Avrupa savunması denkleminde önemli bir oyuncu. Ve öyle de kalacak.