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Batı Politikaları Merkezi Politika Danışmanı Ret. Senior Policy Advisor The Western Policy Center Turning Point For Turkey: A Key Ally at Risk During my Army career I have worked closely with Turkish military officers in Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, Washington, Naples, and at SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium. We formed some close friendships, sorted out some politico-military issues together, especially vis-?-vis Cyprus and Greece, and developed strong bonds of mutual trust. While I was in Ankara, three of my visits were with senior members of the Turkish General Staff, one of whom I first met in Washington in 1979 and again in Cyprus in 1987, another in Ankara in 1980, and yet another in NATO in 1991. I mention this to point out that my analysis of Turkey's security policies and the role of the Turkish General Staff is based less on an academic foundation and more on that of a close observer of that country and the personalities, predominantly military, involved with forming its defense policies. This perspective probably has its merits and its shortfalls. Nevertheless, I hope that some of my remarks will be useful to this audience and to others interested in the future of this importantally. A good first question concerning Turkey is to ask whether or not it is indeed at a turning point or is it really at an internal crisis point, the kind that many other countries face from time-to-time? If it is the former, in what direction will Turkey go and under what circumstances? Will it turn its Western orientation eastward? What of the political dimension of the country? Will it continue to pursue secular and democratic institutions or will Islamic traditions begin to change the character of the Turkish state? In other words, if it is at a turning point, where does it turn? Does it look north to Russia, east to Iran, south to the Arab states, or elsewhere? Turkey may not be so much at a turning point as it is at a political and/or economic crisis point. You can certainly make the case that the political system is adversely affected by some mediocre personalities, corruption, and a lack of public confidence. The economy seems to be reeling from high inflation, low investment, high population growth, banking scandals, and other problems. The important distinction between being at a "turning point" versus being at a political and/or economic "crisis point" is that the former will definitely have long-term affects on regional security, international organizations, and many interested countries, including the United States, while the latter has more impact internally and can usually be corrected in the near to mid-term. For reasons I'll point out later, I do not think Turkey is at a turning point that would cause it to refocus or alter its commitment to secularism, democracy, a free-market economy, or its defense and security arrangements. Of course, Turkey's political, economic, social, and military orientation will assuredly impact upon broad policy questions such as the EU, NATO, trans-Atlantic relations, Cyprus, the Aegean, the Balkans, Iraq, Iran, and Israeli-Palestinian problems. In fact, it is this realization that has recently led Greece to embark on a new and more positive policy of its own towards Turkey, which includes actively promoting full EU membership. Greece's reasoning is that a Turkey in the European Union is a Turkey, which has fulfilled all the criteria for membership and, ipso facto, becomes less of a threat and more of a regional partner. Greece is also actively supporting Cyprus' membership in the EU as a means of ending the current division of that island nation. However, it may not be the panacea to the Cyprus problem that many expect it to be. Some of the important subsets to the broader foreign policy questions Turkey faces include its role in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), theater missile defense, the transportation and security of the Caspian Sea energy reserves, Cyprus' accession to the EU before a political settlement, access to the Aegean Sea, and Balkan stability. Turning now to an analysis of Turkey's future defense relationships and priorities, I would emphasis these five points: First, the centerpiece for Turkish security will remain NATO. ESDP, while a complicating factor with the EU, is more a political issue than a military one. It is hard to imagine a scenario where the EU has so strong an interest that it is willing to commit military forces that is not also of interest to the United States or NATO in general. Potential threats to Turkey's eastern and southern borders are best dealt with in a NATO context. NATO remains Turkey's single most important and official link to both Europe and the United States. It will not jeopardize this critical relationship. NATO, with its new command structure, is able to play a more constructive role in the Aegean and in promoting confidence and communication between Greece and Turkey. NATO leadership in the Balkans provides a framework for regional member states to cooperate and not compete with one another. Turkey takes a long historical view and would be wary of the potential of facing a resurgent Russia outside a NATO context. Second, maintaining a strong and modern conventional force is important for regional stability. Iran, Iraq, and Syria, all immediate neighboring states, must factor in Turkish military capabilities to their foreign policy decisions. This must have some moderating influence on their behavior. Modern forces also increase Turkey's importance with other countries and institutions. They allow Turkey to participate as full partners in NATO operations like Kosovo, PFP, and STANAVFORMED, and non-NATO ones such as Somalia. Caspian Sea energy reserves will surely pass through pipelines across Turkey, by tankers through the Turkish Straits, or both. The security of this vitally important commodity to future world stability and economic prosperity will rest partially on the Turkish armed forces. This is a role and mission that TGS will take very seriously. Third, keeping a large military force has a stabilizing effect internally. The Turkish military is largely a conscripted force. In addition to traditional military skills, conscripts also learn many that are readily adaptable to civilian life and they are generally better prepared to find employment when they leave service than when they entered. The military is the single most trusted institution in Turkey and it provides ordinary citizens a sense of security against foreign and domestic threats to public order. Fourth, in addition to NATO, Turkey's growing interest in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia, will result in more bilateral military agreements and cooperation, much like we are seeing now with Israel. These will be in addition to its NATO membership and not at its expense. Fifth, Turkish defense policy in the Aegean and Cyprus will be driven by several principles: A mutually agreed to formula with Greece giving each country a "fair share" of development rights to the Aegean Sea bed in international waters. Any issue that would promote the increase of Greece's share at the expense of Turkey's will be vigorously challenged. International air and sea space in the Aegean will not be altered at the expense of Turkey. In Cyprus, there are three important points to TGS: Potentially hostile military bases will not be allowed. Turkish Cypriots must be physically secure. Any agreement to the reduction of the Turkish forces on Cyprus must allow for their return if either of the first two points is violated. This is similar to the guarantor status now afforded to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom under the Treaty of Guarantee, signed on 16 August 1960. Turkey will also insist on the political equality of the two communities. The future relationship of Turkey and the EU will ultimately be decided on each other's perception of the value gained, or lost, by expanding it. In this regard there are several points worth noting: Turkey will retain its Western orientation even if full EU membership is not obtained. Greece appears committed to Turkey's EU membership and will assist where it can to keep it focused on meeting the criteria for that eventuality. However, a miscalculation in Cyprus or in the Aegean could alter Greece's current position on this. The Turkish military views security concerns in the Aegean and in Cyprus as more important than full EU membership. The EU may be wary of a large, predominantly non-Christian population, having unfettered access to its member states. On the other hand, as Turkey's large population becomes more affluent, it diminishes the likelihood of immigration to Europe and it offers the EU an enormous potential market. Also, Turkey provides the EU the best window to influence growing markets in the Caucuses and Central Asia. In the near future, Turkey will gain increased importance among the largest users of Caspian Sea energy reserves, and the EU will be one of them. The role of the Turkish General Staff, and the military in general, in the social fabric of Turkey is very large indeed. The influence of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, on the thinking of the Turkish people, while not as strong today as it was seventy-five years ago, is still significant. It was Ataturk who took the defeated Ottoman Empire, with its mainly Near Eastern outlook, headed by a Sultan/Caliph, and totally reoriented it towards Europe and the West. Both outwardly and inwardly, he set into motion a significant series of changes from dress codes to the alphabet, and from the legal system to the political structure, which firmly established the notion of a Western-styled republic. And, importantly, he made the military the guarantor that Turkey would not stray from his vision of a secular, Western, democratic state. Most of us are aware of the decisive role that the Turkish military has played in the political process over the past forty years. Some people criticize them for this and accuse the military of inhibiting democratic development. Others praise them for restoring public order, warding off religious fundamentalist political initiatives, and preserving the secular nature of the republic. In 1980 I was serving as the Assistant Army Attach? in Ankara and witnessed the breakdown of law and order under the civilian government. Teachers were being shot by students, politically motivated assassinations were reaching about fourteen per month, including a good friend of mine, Master Chief Petty Officer Sam Novello, USN, gunned down, along with his Turkish driver in Istanbul. The police were heavily politicized, with extreme right and left wing factions, and bombings were commonplace, one of which was detonated in my back yard, leaving a vivid reminder of how anarchists and terrorists can quickly alter the sense of personal security so important to all of us. After repeated warnings to the government, the military took over power in September 1980. The main criticism at that time from the people was "why did the Army wait so long?" But what of the future? Are military interventions into the political process a thing of the past? And, will the power and influence of the TGS change as Turkey moves to fulfill requirements for EU membership? First, the answer to whether or not the military will intervene depends more on the capabilities of any civilian government to do three things: Prevent anarchy and protect the public safety. Maintain a secular and democratic form of government, and Keep a Western orientation, including NATO membership. As Turkish politics mature, becoming more efficient, more responsible, less factious, and more prone to compromise, I'm confident that the role of the military will decrease accordingly. In summary, the current economic crisis and weak political parties are sserious problems but in time they will be dealt with. The level of Turkey's participation in ESDP, its EU membership, the future of Cyprus, and many other issues, while important, will not force Turkey to turn away from the course Ataturk set for it many years ago. When Ataturk was in the middle of making his social and political changes and reforms he used this analogy to explain why there were so many, "I was trying to play a Western tune on Eastern instruments and it didn't work very well." Since then, almost all the Eastern instruments have been changed to Western ones. Some may need more tuning and the "musicians" may need more practice, but the tune begun almost eighty years ago will be the same. Albay STEPHEN R. NORTON: "TÜRKİYE İÇİN DÖNÜM NOKTASI:" KİLİT NOKTASINDAKİ BİR DOST TEHLİKEDE Türkiye'nin laiklik, demokrasi ve serbest pazar ekonomisine olan bağlılığını veya savunma düzenlemelerini değiştirmesine neden olacak bir dönüm noktasında olduğu kanısında değilim. Türkiye'nin politik, ekonomik, sosyal ve askeri alanlardaki yönelimi elbette AB, NATO, Atlantik ötesi ilişkiler, Kıbrıs, Ege, Balkanlar, Irak, İran ve İsrail-Filistin sorunlarına ilişkin genel politikalarını etkileyecektir. Yunanistan'ın son zamanlarda Türkiye'ye karşı yürüttüğü yeni ve daha olumlu politika da bu gerçeğin farkedilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Türkiye'nin gelecekteki savunma ilişkilerine ve önceliklerine gelince, şu beş noktayı vurgulamak istiyorum: 1. NATO Türkiye'nin güvenliği konusunda merkezi bir rol oynamayı sürdürecektir. 2. Güçlü ve modern konvansiyonel silahlı kuvvetlere sahip olmak, bölgesel dengeler açısından önemlidir. 3. Büyük bir ordu iç dengeyi koruyucu bir unsurdur. 4. Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu, Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya'ya giderek artan ilgisi, yeni ikili askeri anlaşmalarla sonuçlanacaktır. 5. Türkiye'nin Ege ve Kıbrıs'taki savunma politikasına şu ilkeler yön verecektir: - Ege ve uluslararası suların adil paylaşımını sağlayacak bir formül. - Kıbrıslı Türklerin güvenliğinin ve iki toplum arasında siyasi eşitliğin sağlanması. Türkiye AB üyesi olmasa da Batı'ya yönelik olmayı sürdürecektir. Atatürk, Doğu enstrümanlarıyla Batı melodileri çalmaya çalıştığını söylemişti. O zamandan beri, Doğu enstrümanlarının yerini Batınınkiler aldı. Belki bazılarının akort edilmesi ve müzisyenlerin prova yapması gerekebilir, ama seksen yıl kadar önce başlayan melodi değişmedi. |