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Member of the European Commission Responsible for External Relations Dış İlişkilerden Sorumlu AB Komisyonu Üyesi EU Strategy in the Balkans It often feels like that in the where hope is continually jousting with despair, where you can wake up in the morning to signs of spring but close the shutters on an evening dark and cold. Rarely more so than recently. Despair as guns and rockets crackled around the mountains near Skopje, and refugees were on the move again. Hope as, a few hundred kilometres to the North, Belgrade democrats sent Milosevic to The Hague. Hope again as the EU-NATO brokered cease-fire took hold in Skopje. And today, political turbulence in Croatia. Next week, who knows? The Balkans are part of Europe. We are – as it were – in the same boat. Our past and our futures are intimately bound together. Our peoples want the same things – peace, stability, high standards and decency in public life, freedom, prosperity and opportunity. We have a shared interest in working together to combat organised crime, to ensure respect for minorities and to help build strong states in the region which are capable of protecting the interests of all their citizens, and of being dependable and good neighbours. That is what EU taxpayers want from their heavy investment in the Balkans. They want and are entitled to know how we are doing. Our objectives But what are we trying to do exactly? I think it can be simply stated: our objective is to transform this part of our European continent, to equip it to sustain liberal democracy and the rule of law, rooted in strong institutions, supported by thriving market economies trading with each other and with the wider Europe. My hope and my aim is that children starting at primary school today in Albania, in Bosnia, in Croatia, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, will, when they come to leave school, be living in countries – their own countries – that are radically changed for the better; prosperous, stable European democracies, at peace with each other and at peace with themselves, either members of the EU or well on the road to membership. To put it like that is to recognise clearly the scale of the task. An ambitious vision like ours also requires close partnership with other key players. With NATO, whose military commitment will be crucial for many years to ensure the security necessary for peace to take a strong hold. Within the Stability Pact, with the UN and the OSCE, with the World Bank, with the EIB and the EBRD, with NGOs, with the United States, and with others, and above all with the peoples and governments of the region. On the Commission side: We have put in a place a new and simpler regulation – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilisation, or CARDS – governing all our assistance to the region, and focused it on the major priorities of the Stabilisation and Association Process, our central policy for the region, on which I shall say more later. We have considerably speeded up the delivery of EU aid in much of the region. We have set up the which is delivering our assistance in Kosovo and now in Serbia and Montenegro too with a speed and efficiency that outpaces most other donors. There are still problems, I know. I am determined we will resolve them. But we have started to make a real difference, and the establishment in Brussels of our new aid delivery office in January this year will soon start to improve our performance more widely, with its faster procedures, increased staff, and devolution of management to the field. In the region, the big picture looks very different today to when I started this job. Democratic, reform-minded governments in Belgrade and in Zagreb always were – and remain– a prerequisite for a lasting solution throughout the region. Yet nineteen months ago, Tudjman was still in power, and Croatia was in the political deep freeze. Just ten months ago, Milosevic still ruled the roost in Belgrade, and the European Union and the US, with others, were busy helping to support the independent media, and to shore up democracy in Montenegro. I remember some argued that there was little chance of change in Belgrade. It was said that our policy of backing the opposition, reaching out to the people of Serbia, while tightening the pressure on Milosevic was misguided. It was said then that we lacked a strategy, and that at the rate we were going, Milosevic would be in power for years to come. Look at Castro, they said. Look at Saddam Hussein. But today – thanks to the determination of the Serbian people – Serbia is a democracy. Croatia – if one is prepared, as a ‘Brit’ to overlook sending one of her gallant sons to defeat England’s champion Tim Henman and take the Wimbledon title yesterday (I’m told that he’s become an honorary Englishman) - has made enormous political and economic strides under its reforming government. Change, in other words, that some thought impossible has happened. Overall, the regional picture is better than a year ago. Democratic, reform minded governments are now in power across the region. Diplomatic relations have been restored between all of them. All have joined – or are joining – key international organisations, including the UN, the IMF, WTO, OSCE. There is evidence of a more constructive approach to common problems – including a greater maturity in managing crises and tensions in bilateral relations. Take, for example, Croatia’s efforts to isolate Bosnian Croat extremists; Albania’s approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and Belgrade’s handling of the insurgency in Southern Serbia. A network of regional co-operation initiatives is picking up steam, ranging from the South East Europe Co-operation Process to the Adriatic-Ionian initiative. But we still face big threats At the same time, we face new and serious problems, which threaten these achievements, and which, if we do not resolve them, risk setting off a new conflagration. In the Balkans, like the old English floral dance, it is often a case of two steps forward, one step back. We mustn’t let this dishearten or depress us. We must resist the temptation to return anxiously to the drawing board, wondering if we should rip up our plan and start all over again. Because there is no better option but to press on. We must keep our basic offer to the Balkans firmly and visibly on the table: practical and political help to integrate into the European mainstream, for those countries prepared to implement drastic reforms, and live up to the values that have shaped our own destiny in recent decades. Full co-operation with is one indication of commitment to those values, that lie at the heart of the Stabilisation and Association Process. It matters. Without justice, there can be no lasting peace in the Balkans. Croatia’s President Mesic is absolutely right: it is only by establishing individual guilt that the idea of collective guilt can be removed; it is only by establishing justice that states can begin to work with and trust each other again. The transfer of Milosevic was a truly historic step forward. But it was not the end of the road. All indictees – wherever they are – must be transferred to The Hague. I applaud the decision of the Croatian Government to comply with their international obligations in respect of indictments by the I urge the people of Croatia to support that decision, difficult though that may be for many of them to do: it is the only course of action open to their government if it is serious about Croatia’s European future and international commitments. Implementing the strategy Because the cleverest and most imaginative constitutional arrangements in the world are without meaning if they cannot be implemented and sustained. Twenty years ago in my first Ministerial job I found myself working on what many regarded as the dull business of trying to improve housing and social conditions in Northern Ireland, of trying to re-establish local government there, all as it turned out stepping stones to later progress. So I want to stand back, and focus in more detail on the rationale behind the and on what implementing the strategy really means, both for the EU and for the region. The basic incentive: and what the EU expects in return I don’t imagine that people in the Balkans – any more than in EU Member States - have a very precise notion of the finer points of the EU’s institutional architecture. But they identify the EU with security, with jobs, with a decent and rising standard of living, with the rule of law upheld by accountable, democratic, clean public institutions, a system in which rights of minorities are protected by law, not by carving out territory. They recognise the EU as probably the most successful conflict prevention and resolution mechanism in history. And they desperately want to be part of it. This gives the EU enormous leverage. Our task is, through the Stabilisation and Association Process, to use it – together with a judicious mix of what diplomats call sticks and carrots - to inject, over time, stability, democracy and the rule of law into the body politic of the countries of South East Europe, much as the enlargement process has helped to bring stability to the candidate countries in the decade following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its European Empire. We offer – in these Stabilisation and Association Agreements – a special and demanding contractual relationship. It reflects the status of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as potential candidates for membership of the EU. The whole process of preparing for, negotiating, and implementing the agreements constitutes a powerful motor for change. It offers the region a dynamic relationship with the EU, in which we help these countries to transform their systems of government, so that they become capable of delivering the stability their citizens crave, and step by step, become more like Member States and in so doing prepare themselves for membership. But co-operation is a two way street. In exchange for the assistance we offer, the countries will have to demonstrate unequivocally that they really share the EU’s core political values, including respect for human rights, regional co-operation, full co-operation with the ICTY, and refugee return. They will need to work hard on economic reform in order to build solid market economies capable of competing freely and openly with Member States and they will need to build administrations capable of implementing EU law in a way which wins the confidence of Member States and creates the confidence necessary for the high degree of integration which comes with EU membership. The very core of the Stabilisation and Association Process consists in tackling the institutional weakness that besets, in varying degrees, the entire region. Rectifying that is the key to long term stability, and - as philosophers would say – the necessary though not sufficient condition for eventual EU membership. It’s not a new problem. The 1914 Carnegie Endowment report into the causes of the Balkan wars noted: ‘_if we look for palliating causes of these gross lapses of basic decency and the rule of law, we must find them in the immaturity of national institutions and civic character’. One of the main reasons why the Balkans are so unstable is that democracy and the rule of law have never put down strong roots. Empires have come and gone; governments have risen and fallen; but democracy – and above all the rule of law – has never settled. Today, at least, all the government leaders in the region talk the language of Europeanisation and reform. But I sometimes wonder how many really understand what it means, or the major practical and cultural adjustments it entails? And I wonder – sometimes – if we in the EU really grasp the scale of the challenge we have, quite rightly taken on? The Stabilisation and Association Agreements are a practical agenda for change. They create a partnership which brings the EU right inside how each state works – or doesn’t – and allows it to work with those states to make the changes necessary to upgrade their performance to the EU’s level. It is this very practical work that will decide the success or failure of our efforts in the Balkans, as much as the more glamorous strategies and statements that emerge from meetings of European leaders. These have their place. They give impetus and visibility to what we are trying to do. But they are not enough on their own. The EU’s responsibility does not end the minute the ink is dry on the latest declaration or decision to move the process a step forward. It is only a beginning which those on the ground have to be given the time to turn into real change. And real reform, real progress has to determine the EU’s decisions to move further in its relationship with each country. It is no coincidence that the Stabilisation and Association Agreements are modelled on the Europe Agreements we have with today’s candidate countries, and draw heavily on our experience and success there. They are proven instruments, reconfigured to the situation in the Balkans. They impose heavy obligations, which is why I am so concerned that we should not rush this process or over-politicise it. Because it is not enough just to photocopy EU legislation and hope for the best. Laws have got to be enforced and understood, not just proclaimed. In the Balkans, as elsewhere, people have got to be convinced that the law will protect their legitimate interests and they must respect it. If reform means hard work and some sacrifice, as it will, people need to understand why it is worth it. That requires careful preparation and patient persuasion. In every country in the Stabilisation and Association process, we are now working closely with the governments and communities to change things; and the intensity of that work will grow in the coming years, as the assistance and backing of our CARDS programme increasingly kicks in. Concrete examples of what we are doing Let me give one or two examples of what I mean: We are working to improve judicial capacity, training judges in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and computerising court records in Albania, so judges across the country can see how similar cases have been handled, and work towards a more consistent application of the law. We are advising on the drafting of new legislation, to make sure it is EU compatible, and user friendly for foreign investors. We are advising and equipping police forces, for example in Albania, to enable them to handle tense situations in a way that doesn’t provoke disorder. We are helping countries – the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Croatia, for example - to take advantage of the trade concessions we have offered by making sure their goods meet EU standards, through a series of trade facilitation measures, such as the improvement of phyto-sanitory inspection facilities, developing systems for the mutual recognition of standards, ensuring more efficient processing; and we are helping more generally to get agriculture back on its feet again. We are building professional customs services, on which the free flow of goods depends. In Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo this work has made a big difference already - increasing revenue yields and seizures of illegal goods. In Albania, where we have been running a customs assistance mission since 1997, customs revenues have gone up from Euro170 million in 1997 to Euro364 million in 2000. We have put in place a new customs code in line with the EC’s, and a recruitment system based on merit, through open competition, a career structure which is also based on merit and which offers incentives for promotion, not for corruption. This system, developed as a pilot customs service, is now serving as a model for overall public administration reform in Albania. Our highly effective customs assistance mission in Bosnia has helped establish a common customs policy and tariff, and to model the customs and tax administration in Bosnia on EU standards. The specific case of organised crime A decade of war and instability has provided the perfect conditions for organised crime networks to become well established, efficient and violent. Criminal gangs exploit the weakness of border management in the region, and of local law enforcement agencies. Gangs based in the region are now involved in the trafficking of human beings, and act as a staging post for some two thirds of the heroin seized in Member States, as well as in money laundering and cigarette smuggling. This pernicious web of organised crime feeding nationalism and extremism – and vice versa – corrupting and emasculating public administrations, police and the judiciary is one of the biggest threats to the EU’s ambitions for the region. Our electorates will increasingly demand decisive action to deal with the obscenity of Europe’s prostitution traffic and the violence it brings in its wake, and to cut back on the car crime on our city streets which supplies the region with flashy cars. I would love there to be quick solutions. There are not. Again we have to be systematic and persistent. We intend – through the CARDS programme and working closely with Member States – to establish a functioning Interpol network in each country, fully linked to the rest of the Interpol network and, increasingly, with Europol. We will help to establish a functioning regional judicial and prosecutorial network, including joint investigations and prosecutions dealing with cross border crime. We will help to establish a common and Schengen-compatible policy on visas, immigration and asylum. We are going to step up our efforts to help the countries of the region establish effective border management and border control, building on the impressive progress that has been made in Bosnia with the establishment of the State Border Service. The emergence of five new nations from the break-up of the former Yugoslavia has created over 5000 kms of new international borders in the region. Many of these are not even marked, the emergent border control agencies are weak and ineffective, and the border crossing points are not equipped to handle the traffic crossing them. Our help ranges from significant funding for major new border crossing points, or equipment, such as the border communications system we are supplying in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to simple but effective procedural techniques such as harmonising opening hours and promoting shared facilities – thereby also building cross border co-operation and trust . The regional dimension, and plugging the Balkans back into the wider European construction It is a huge agenda. At the same time, throughout the region, we are getting on with the basic work of physical reconstruction: fixing roads and bridges, building houses, mending power grids and electricity lines. Much of this physical reconstruction work, like the institution building, helps to build the regional co-operation that we very much want to encourage. It is not enough for the countries of the region to co-operate with the EU. We want them to co-operate increasingly closely with each other, as they undertook to do at the Zagreb summit last year. If our strategy is to make sense it must contribute to the EU’s wider strategic goal of a continent of Europe that is united and inter-connected. So energy, infrastructure and communication links in the Balkans need to be part of the massive task of reconnecting our whole continent. The Stability Pact, whose perspective is wider than the Balkans and which has successfully recruited the Central and East European countries to the cause of integrating the Balkans into the European family, has a special role to play here. That is why, for example, we and the World Bank are working very closely with the Pact on developing comprehensive transport and energy strategies which plug the Balkans back into wider Europe. But how are we doing with the strategy in each country? In the there has been enormous political progress in a very short time. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia really does appear determined to make a break with its recent past. But the real work of institutional and economic reform is only now beginning, and the constitutional relationship with Montenegro remains unresolved. The Donors’ Conference which we organised with the World Bank has provided the funds needed to get that reform underway in the coming year. It will be a formidable task – both in Serbia and in Montenegro. In the government elected last year has made a very impressive start on reform. It has accomplished a speedy return to the European mainstream and concluded the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in record time. It was initialled in May, and will be signed in the Autumn. That Agreement offers a framework for the formidable political and economic reform programme on which Croatia must now embark; it represents the beginning, not the end of that process. We signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Skopje in April this year. It was the first country to conclude such an agreement with the EU. Some people – given the grave crisis that the country now faces – wonder if this was entirely wise. I believe it was the right thing to do. It recognised the structural reforms that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had carried out, and which had been praised by the World Bank and others. What has happened in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, reinforces rather than undermines my central theme in this speech: the importance of not rushing this process, of building up institutions capable of commanding the confidence of the minority as well as the majority, as well as the importance of building up capacity in the region to tackle organised crime, manage borders properly and so on. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provides for just that. It commits the government to specific steps to protect the rights of minorities. In that sense is providing a framework within which to help tackle the present crisis, and to tackle the legitimate grievances of the Albanian community which need to be addressed as part of an overall political solution. Our immediate priority, of course, must be to extinguish the conflict, and to achieve such a political solution. That is what the EU – working exceptionally closely alongside NATO, and the US – has been intensively working to help achieve. Conclusion Europe is ringed – from in the North, to the to the - by an arc of danger and instability. We have to manage that danger, remove that instability. In the Balkans, we are providing evidence of a more coherent, long term EU approach, in which we try to harness all the immense resources of the European Union, and deploy them in support of our policy. We are slowly, steadily reinforcing and stitching together what Winston Churchill memorably called ‘the sinews of peace’. Whether we succeed or not is a key test of our nascent common foreign and security policy, of our ability to project stability beyond our borders and into our immediate neighbourhood. There are, of course, those who advocate a different course. There are the cynics who have no hope of ever making any progress in the Balkans. There are those who contend that the region is a vortex of evil; that there is something in the Balkan gene that condemns people to fight and kill one another, and we should leave it well alone - as if that were historically accurate, morally defensible or politically wise. There are still others who believe that the problems of the region can be solved by a grand conference and a bit of cartographic cut and paste; a sort of latter day Congress of Berlin. I must say that I don’t find that an immensely persuasive argument. The answer to the region’s problems is more enlightened government, not more inspired map making. I do not pretend that we have got it all right. I have no doubt that there are things we can do better. But we are, I think, on the right basic course, and we need to hold to it in the Balkans, just as we have held to it in Central and Eastern Europe. The question is not whether we have a strategy, whether we have a comprehensive plan of action: it is whether or not we have the staying power, the political will, to see it through. Back, once again, to those children at primary school. Just over a decade ago, a child at primary school in Poland was living in a country that was receiving food aid from the European Union. Today Poland stands on the threshold of becoming a member of the European Union, and the children who were still at primary school in Warsaw when the Wall came down will embark on their adult lives as EU citizens - their prospects in life having been utterly transformed. We have the chance now – together - to make that sort of historic difference in the Balkans in the coming years. This is not yet Mission Accomplished. Far from it. But nor, as the more encouraging events of the last year have shown, is it Mission Impossible. CHRIS PATTEN: “AB’NİN BALKAN STRATEJİSİ” Balkanlardaki mevcut durumun karışıklığı ve bölgenin AB açısından stratejik önemi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, AB’nin bir Balkan stratejisi olması gerektiği açıktır. Balkanlar, Avrupa’nın bir parçasıdır. Halklarımız aynı şeyleri, yani barış, istikrar, kamu yaşamında yüksek standartlar ve ahlak, özgürlük, refah ve fırsat istiyor. Organize suça karşı direnmek, azınlık haklarına saygı duymak ve bütün vatandaşların çıkarlarını koruyabilecek güçlü devletler oluşturmak hepimizin istediği şeylerdir. Bu bölgede benimsenecek strateji uzun vadeli, stratejinin uygulanması aşamasında kaçınılmaz olarak ortaya çıkacak sorun ve engellerle baş edebilecek kadar güçlü ve esnek olmalıdır. Amacımız, Avrupa kıtasının bu bölgesini değiştirmek, liberal ekonomiyi ve hukukun üstünlüğünü devamlı hale getirmek, güçlü kurumsal kökler oluşturmak, birbiriyle ve genel olarak Avrupa’yla ticaret yapan güçlü pazarlardan oluşan bir ekonomi kurmaktır. Böyle bir amaca ulaşmak için, ana oyuncularla da yakın işbirliği içinde çalışmalıyız. NATO’nun askeri varlığı, bölgede barışın baskın çıkması için çok önemlidir. İstikrar Paktı, BM, AGİT, Dünya Bankası, Avrupa Kalkınma Bankası, Avrupa Yatırım Bankası, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve en önemlisi bölgedeki hükümetler ve halklarla bir arada çalışmalıyız. Son iki yıl içinde bölgede AB’nin performansını artırmak amacıyla güçlü bir strateji oluşturduk, bu bölgede yaşayanları, üye devletleri ve uluslararası toplumu söz konusu stratejiyi destekleme konusunda ikna ettik ve taahhütlerimizi yerine getirmeye başladık. Oluşturduğumuz yeniden yapılanma birimi sayesinde Kosova, Sırbistan ve Karadağ’da yardım faaliyetlerimizi diğer yardım kuruluşlarından çok daha hızlı ve etkin bir biçimde devam ettiriyoruz. Demokrasi İçin Enerji programıyla, Miloseviç muhaliflerine destek verdik. Özellikle tarım konusunda benzeri görülmemiş açıklıkta asimetrik ticari önlemler alarak, AB pazarlarını Balkanlardan gelen ihracata tamamen açtık. Bazılarının Belgrad’da fazla bir umut olmadığını, muhalefete destek veren, Sırp halkına elini uzatan ve Miloseviç’e daha fazla baskı yapan politikamızın yanlış olduğunu söylüyordu. Günümüzde bazılarının imkansız olduğuna inandığı değişiklikler gerçekleşti. Genel olarak bölgedeki durum bir yıl öncesine kıyasla daha iyi. Bölgenin çeşitli yerlerinde demokratik ve reformları destekleyen hükümetler var. Ortak sorunlara karşı daha yapıcı bir yaklaşım benimseniyor ve ikili ilişkilerde yaşanan krizlere ve gerginliklere karşı daha olgun bir tutum sergileniyor. Ancak aynı zamanda, çözüme kavuşturulmadığı takdirde sorun yaratma riski taşıyan yeni ve ciddi sorunlarla da karşı karşıyayız. On yıldır devam eden savaş ve istikrarsızlık ortamı sonucu, organize suç birimleri köklü, etkin ve şiddet dolu hale gelmiştir. Çeteler, bölgedeki sınır uygulamalarının ve yerel kolluk kuvvetlerinin zayıflıklarından yararlanmaktadır. AB’nin bölgedeki amaçlarına ulaşmasındaki en büyük engel, uç milliyetçiliği destekleyen, kamu idarelerini, polisi ve yargı sistemini yozlaştıran organize suçtur. Amacımız, bölgedeki ülkelerden her birinde gerekli işlevleri yerine getirebilen bir Interpol kurmak ve söz konusu birimlerin diğer Interpol’lerle ve Europol ile işbirliği içinde çalışmasını sağlamaktır. Balkan halkı AB’yi güvenlik, istihdam, yüksek yaşam standartları, hukukun üstünlüğüne dayanan, hesap veren, demokratik ve temiz kamu kurumları ve kanunlarla korunan azınlık haklarıyla bağdaştırmaktadır. Amacımız, AB’nin bu avantajlı durumunu kullanarak zaman içinde güney doğu Avrupa’daki ülkelerin siyasi birimlerini istikrar, demokrasi ve hukukun üstünlüğüne kavuşturmaktır. Bölgedeki ülkeler, onlara sunduğumuz yardım karşılığında AB’nin temel siyasi değerlerine, özellikle insan hakları, bölgesel işbirliği, Uluslararası Savaş Suçluları Mahkemesi ile tam işbirliği ve mültecilerin geri dönmesi gibi konulara tamamen destek verdiklerini göstermek durumundadır. Üye devletlerle özgür ve açık olarak rekabet edebilecek güçlü pazar ekonomileri oluşturmak için çok çalışmaları, üye devletlerin güvenini kazanacak biçimde AB kanunlarını uygulayabilecek idareler oluşturmaları ve AB üyeliği sonucu ortaya çıkan ileri düzeyde entegrasyon için gerekli güveni kurmaları gerekecektir. Balkanların bu kadar istikrarsız olmasının nedenlerinden biri, demokrasi ve hukukun üstünlüğünün güçlü kökler salamamış olmasıdır. Bu bölgede amaç, pazar ekonomisinin gelir yaratması için gerekli demokratik ve kurumsal yapıların oluşması, söz konusu ekonomileri sürdürülebilir kılacak doğrudan yabancı yatırımın bölgeye çekilmesi, bölgedeki ülkelerin birbirleriyle ve AB ile ticaret yapmasının sağlanmasıdır. Ayrıca kamu daireleri, polis teşkilatı, merkez bankası, göç ve sınır hizmetleri, özgür ve bağımsız medya gibi birimlerin bütün vatandaşların güvenini kazanacak biçimde etkin ve sorumluluk sahibi biçimde çalışmasıdır. Balkanlarda fiziksel yeniden yapılanma çalışmalarına da devam ediyoruz; yolları ve köprüleri tamir ediyor, evler inşa ediyor, ana enerji ve elektrik hatlarını onarıyoruz. Ülkeler arasındaki enerji dağıtım sistemi halen çok sınırlı, oysa tek bir enerji pazarı bölgenin enerji sorunlarının çoğunu çözebilir. Bölgedeki zayıf altyapı ağı ekonomik gelişmeyi de yavaşlatmaktadır. Bu tür çalışmalar gönülden desteklediğimiz bölgesel işbirliğini de güçlendirmektedir. Balkan ülkelerinin AB ile işbirliği yapması yeterli değildir, asıl birbirleriyle daha çok işbirliği içinde çalışmalarını istiyoruz. Yani Balkanlardaki enerji, altyapı ve iletişim şebekeleri, ülkelerimiz arasında bağlantı kurma sürecinin bir parçası haline gelmelidir. Buradaki asıl soru, belirli bir stratejimiz veya eylem planımız olup olmadığı değildir. Asıl soru, söz konusu stratejiyi sonuna kadar destekleyecek kararlılığa ve siyasi iradeye sahip olup olmadığımızdır. |