Lord GEORGE ROBERTSON NATO Genel Sekreteri NATO Secretary General Enhancing NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: Part Of The Alliance's Transformation Agenda September was a month in which we commemorated and reflected. In which we looked back to 11 September of last year, and considered the impact of the brutal terrorist attacks that were perpetrated on that day. The terrorist attacks against the United States shook the world, and they shook the Alliance. But they also concentrated the minds of the NATO Allies. And they strengthened our determination to prepare the Alliance for the entire spectrum of security challenges it might come up against in this new era. My message is a simple one. That NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue must be part of the Alliance's transformation agenda. And the reason is clear. Because NATO is not an inward-looking, self-centred Alliance. NATO is in tune with the world around it -- mindful that the security of its members is closely linked to that of neighbouring countries -- and conscious of the responsibilities this entails. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, this strong conviction inspired NATO to engage neighbouring countries in Central and Eastern Europe in partnership and cooperation. And just a few years later, in 1994, this same conviction led the Alliance to also look to its Southern neighbours, and seek to engage them in its Mediterranean Dialogue process. And I would like to pay tribute to the man who is now the President of the Italian Republic and who did so much to advance this agenda, Mr. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. NATO's active engagement of its neighbours to the East has been a tremendous success. It has resulted in a web of profound security relationships across the Euro-Atlantic Area including countries as diverse as Ireland and Azerbaijan. Forty-six countries now regularly discuss security issues together, train and exercise together, and carry out peacekeeping operations together. As we saw when NATO's Partners rallied behind the United States shortly after 11 September last year, all this interaction has helped to foster a genuine Euro-Atlantic security culture a real disposition towards working together to meet common challenges. Our Mediterranean Dialogue has also proved to be very successful. Over the past eight years, the scope of the Dialogue has widened significantly. The number of Dialogue countries has grown from five to seven. Political discussions have become more frequent and more intense. The number of cooperative activities has grown from just a few to several hundred. As a result, many misconceptions have been dispelled, and mutual understanding has grown. Over the years, the Alliance has worked hard to broaden and to deepen its partnership frameworks. However, NATO has made a particular effort this past year, in the run-up to the Prague Summit, to bolster both the EAPC and PfP, on the one hand, and the Mediterranean Dialogue, on the other. Our interest in seeking to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue has been influenced primarily by external developments. Last year's terrorist attacks against the United States have turned not just NATO's, but the entire world's attention towards what has been termed as the Greater Middle East. There has also been mounting concern regarding the worsening of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and the breakdown of the Middle East peace process. And then there has been the influx of refugees and asylum seekers here in Italy and in several other European Alliance countries. These developments have reminded us, in a very stark way, of the continuing volatility of the Mediterranean region. And of the way in which this volatility impacts also on our safety, on our economies, and on our general sense of well-being in Europe and America. We all realise that these are deep-rooted, complex, and inter-related problems. Problems that need to be addressed first and foremost by the countries in the region themselves. By politicians who show vision and leadership. Men and women who are prepared to come to terms with the past, but determined also to shape the future that of their own countries, and that of their region. It is clear, at the same time, that the international community has to be involved -- through political engagement and economic cooperation. Among the major international institutions, the European Union obviously has a key role to play. But I firmly believe that NATO has a role as well, in engaging the wider Atlantic community, and complementing and reinforcing the efforts of other international actors. Experience with our Mediterranean Dialogue clearly shows that the Alliance can indeed offer valuable practical cooperation in areas of common interest. That it can help dispel misconceptions and build confidence. And that, in so doing, it can help eradicate any notions there may exist about the West being pitted against the Arab world. Helping to bridge the Mediterranean -- that is what the Alliance has already proven it can do, and that is what I firmly believe it should continue to do. So how do we go about upgrading our Dialogue? Some have suggested turning it into an extension of the EAPC and PfP. That may not be a practical proposition at present. Because even if the overriding principle that underpins all of NATO's partnerships is similar building stability through cooperation the objectives that we have developed with our partners in Europe and Central Asia differ in many respects from where we want to take our Mediterranean Dialogue. We simply cannot transfer cooperative models wholesale from one region to another. We would be overtaxing both NATO's abilities and those of our Mediterranean partners. Having said this, it would be foolish to ignore what we have already achieved with EAPC and PfP. Foolish also, I suggest, not to draw inspiration from the efforts that we have been making with our EAPC and PfP partners to ensure that also after Prague when there will be more Allies and fewer partners EAPC and PfP retain their dynamic, their attractiveness, and their effectiveness. In our effort to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue, I think we would therefore be well-advised to take some cues from the general direction in which the EAPC and PfP have been progressing. Three broad lessons come to mind. It would seem to make sense, first of all, to focus on practical cooperation in areas of common concern, where we can achieve concrete results relatively quickly. I am thinking of, for example, military education, training and doctrine; defence reform and defence economics; counter-terrorism; border security; and civil emergency planning. Cooperation in all these areas is inherently beneficial to each of our Mediterranean partners, regardless of how they view their longer-term relationship with the Alliance. But it will obviously also improve the ability of those of our Mediterranean partners who are already contributing to NATO-led crisis response operations, or who wish to keep open this possibility for the future. Second, I believe that, like the EAPC and PfP, our Mediterranean Dialogue would benefit from enhanced opportunities for political and security-related consultations. We already have considerable experience with what we in NATO call "19+7" and "19+1" formats where all the Allies meet with all the Mediterranean partners, or with individual partners, including at Ambassadorial level. Especially since 11 September of last year, these meetings have proved very valuable, and we should maintain this format. In addition, however, we should explore the scope for introducing greater flexibility into our Dialogue. To recognise that the needs of our Mediterranean partners vary, and that it is up to each of them to identify the kind of cooperation that is best suited to those needs. And to develop a more continuous process of more individualised consultations, involving experts and higher level officials as appropriate, and at a pace that is sustainable for everyone involved -- bearing in mind that we all have busy agendas, limited resources, and competing requirements. Let me add a side note here on adding value by introducing flexibility. Some of the work that we do in the context of the EAPC and PfP, such as on border security or counter-terrorism, would clearly benefit from the involvement of interested Mediterranean partners, and be beneficial to them as well. So I think that we and when I say "we" I really mean NATO and its EAPC and PfP partners -- should definitely also be open to that kind of flexibility if and when we deem it useful. Thirdly, and finally, in order to get real added value from our Dialogue, we should all keep an open-mind. We should be open-minded in terms of deciding whether our Dialogue is really the best instrument to pursue cooperation in a certain area, or whether other fora are perhaps better suited. But open-minded also in the sense of continuing to conduct our cooperation in a transparent and inclusive manner, without raising any suspicions, and always leaving open the possibility for other countries to participate. As I have said on previous occasions, the Mediterranean region matters to the Alliance. It always has mattered -- and it matters even more now than it has ever done in the past. And that is why we want to enhance our Mediterranean Dialogue. Taking my inspiration from the evolution of the EAPC And PfP, I have offered a few suggestions for taking our Mediterranean Dialogue forward for gearing a partnership instrument, that has already proved very valuable, even more closely to the specific concerns and abilities of Allies and Mediterranean partners alike. These were, of course, just my personal suggestions, but I hope that they will be helpful. Because, by making our Mediterranean Dialogue an inherent part of NATO's transformation agenda, we have a real opportunity for making a difference in Mediterranean and Alliance security. It is an opportunity we should not miss. The World in 2015- Prediciting The Unpredictable What kind of strategic environment will be face in 2015? Let me draw a balance sheet, starting with the bad news, and then moving on to the good. My first prediction: more instability in the years ahead. The Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa and the Middle East all offer a rich menu of instability. These regions are going through political and economic transitions of historic dimensions. Ultimately, these transitions will lead them in the right direction. But only the greatest optimist would argue that this process of change will be happening without major convulsions. The unequal distribution of wealth will remain a major source of instability in 2015. And tensions over key resources, such as water, will become a regular pattern as well. My second prediction: more spillover. The instability I just described will not remained confined to the areas where it originates. There will be spillover into Europe. Spillover by way of migration, rising numbers of people seeking asylum, a booming industry in people smuggling, and all the rest that goes it with it: violence, drugs, diseases - you name it. In the world of 2015, with a population of over 7 billion, geography will no longer act as a shield. My third prediction: more terrorism. On September 11, 2001, a threshold was crossed. Until then, most of us shared the view expressed by a well-known terrorism expert: "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead". Since "911", that rule no longer applies. A special breed of terrorism has come to the fore - a breed driven not only by unachievable political aspirations, but also by the urge to kill. It is difficult to imagine how we could return this cruel genie to its pre 9/11 bottle. In short, in 2015, the major threats could be those we term "asymmetric" -- threats in which adversaries avoid direct engagement with us, but exploit the vulnerabilities of our open societies. My fourth prediction: more failed states. September 11 has reminded us that even in an age of globalisation the state remains the central organising principle of modern civilisation This will not change, even in 2015. But not every state is sustainable. In the past decade or so, we have seen too many states collapse, sometimes fragmenting into warlordism, financed by drug smuggling and other criminal activities. As Afghanistan has demonstrated, such failed states are a safe haven for terrorists. Once again, a reminder that what goes on in a country seemingly far away can affect us very quickly -- and fatally. My next prediction: more proliferation. The spread of weapons of mass destruction will be a defining security challenge of this new century. It will le ad to more fingers on more triggers. And not all of these fingers may be operated by rational minds. In such a situation, deterrence may not always deter. And the problem of proliferation is not confined to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Transfers of conventional arms are a problem, too. And as far as this kind of proliferation is concerned, we already have ample proof that it can fan the flames of regional conflict. All this adds up to a guaranteed supply chain of instability. But there is good news as well. Because I believe that despite the challenges we may face, the opportunities ultimately outweigh the risks. The first piece of good news is that democracy will be the winner. The democratic model, in which each citizen participates and thus becomes a stakeholder, will continue to exert a tremendous attraction world-wide. The appeal of democracy is not just a moral one. It is also a pragmatic one: Democracies feature the best survival instincts in an increasingly globalised world: a penchant for problem solving, an ability to make compromises, and not least a built-in generosity towards less fortunate neighbours. All other systems will fall short of these requirements. All this is not to say that every country will now suddenly turn into a textbook democracy, Westminster style. Speeds will differ, and models will differ as well, according to culture and historical experiences. And, some states may not make it at all. But I predict that large parts of the world without conventional democratic structures will follow the powerful trend towards more openness, and more participation by the individual. Because in the end, everyone will want his or her share of the globalisation cake. The second piece of good news is technology. In some quarters of our Western societies, it may have become an ingrained habit to dismiss technological progress as inherently dangerous. Yes, technological progress does have its disadvantages, especially if it results in advanced weaponry falling into the hands of evil-doers. But let's not miss the forest for the trees. The fact remains that the integration of new technologies - information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology and the like - will generate a dramatic increase in innovation. The effects of this innovation will be largely beneficial to us: to our economies as well as to our public health. The third piece of good news is that in my view by 2015 the EU will have turned into a viable international actor, with a tangible Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 2015, the Union may well be twice its current size. Yet it will nevertheless have managed to develop a coherent foreign policy towards neighbouring regions: Russia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Northern Africa. EU countries will also have made progress towards improving their defence capabilities, by reducing wasteful duplication, pooling key assets, and effecting modest increases in defence spending. In short, by 2015 the EU will have moved beyond the economic powerhouse that it already is. By the middle of the next decade, the Union will also be a political force to be reckoned with. The final piece of good news is that the transatlantic security partnership will still be alive and kicking in 2015. Because even in 2015, and despite - indeed, in part because of - a more powerful Europe, the U.S. will provide the indispensable core around which most military coalitions will be built. The centrepiece of this link, NATO, will still be around as well. In some ways, the Alliance of 2015 will bear little resemblance to the NATO of today. Like the EU, NATO's membership will have grown to about 30 countries. Russia will not be a member yet, but a close associate. The relationship with our Partner countries will have deepened further. We'll be cooperating with our Partners on all aspects of security sector reform, on combating terrorism, and on crisis management. But in other ways, the continuities will be striking. NATO will still be a military organisation, the most powerful and effective in the world. Alliance military capabilities will be developing further towards long-range power projection. Because that will be where the military challenge will lie. Specific NATO rapid reaction units will have been created, to address terrorism and other new challenges on short notice. All this will be in line with a security environment that will no longer allow us the time to debate what's "in" and "out-of-area". Protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction, including missile defences, will play a much larger role as well. NATO's unique planning capabilities will be drawn upon not only by the Allies, but by other coalitions and institutions. And, very importantly, we will also have a new Headquarters by then! Now, after I have drawn my brief balance sheet of bad and good news, you can see why I stand by that statement. There is, however, a condition attached. The condition that we continue to invest in defence. Indeed, sufficient investment in defence is the sine qua non for managing the challenges that the world of 2015 has in store for us. Military capability is the crucial underpinning of our safety and security. It directly translates into political credibility. As Kofi Annan once said, you can do a lot with diplomacy, but you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by the threat of force. Indeed, in the real world, the more right military capabilities you have, the less you may need to use them. I said the "right" capabilities because we need capabilities for the future, not for the past. We need more wide-bodied aircraft, and fewer tanks. More precision guided weapons, deployable logistic support troops, ground surveillance systems, and protection against chemical and biological weapons. We need forces that are slimmer, tougher, and faster; forces that reach further, and can stay in the field longer. Where do these capabilities come from? Let us be realistic. Most Allies defence budgets are tightly constrained. Even those who have made the courageous step and increased their budgets have limited flexibility. But that does not mean that we should be idle. We can afford new commitments -- through reprioritisation, through role specialisation, or through multinational cooperation. There are also gains to be made by innovative schemes for procurement and acquisition, such as leasing certain assets, for example. But the defence industrial side also offers potential. A little while ago, it seemed that we were stuck between a rock and a hard place. In Europe, we had a shrinking defence industrial base, ever dwindling defence budgets, and - within those budgets - less money spend on R&D. In the US, we had a major defence industry consolidation process, paired with enormous budget increases and very restrictive regulations on technology transfer to Allies. All this did not bode well for transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. Today, we can be more optimistic. Some European countries have decided to increase their defence budgets. Others are using surgery on unneeded, but expensive, capabilities. There are now encouraging signs of defence industry consolidation within Europe. And there is movement on the issue of US export policies. These steps go in the right direction. But we are not moving fast enough. Accelerating the process of defence industry transformation is a challenge for the experts to ponder. And I can think of no better group of high-calibre experts than those assembled here today. This meeting is in itself testimony to what I referred to earlier as the "survival instincts" of our democracies in an age of globalisation: if there are problems, we'll have to solve them. So I stand by my statement. The world of 2015 will offer no shortage of challenges, but none of them is insurmountable if we prepare for them now. That way, we can make sure that in the world of 2015, very much like today, the opportunities will outweigh the risks. For the better of future generations. "NATO'NUN AKDENİZ DİYALOĞUNU GELİŞTİRMEK: İTTİFAKIN DÖNÜŞÜM GÜNDEMİNİN BİR PARÇASI" NATO'nun Akdeniz Diyaloğunu geliştirmek, ittifakın dönüşüm gündeminin bir parçası olmalıdır çünkü NATO, içe dönük ve kendine odaklanmış bir ittifak değildir. NATO, kendi üyelerinin güvenliğinin, komşu ülkelerin güvenliğiyle doğrudan ilişkili olduğunun ve bu durumun getirdiği sorumlulukların bilincindedir. NATO'nun doğusundaki komşularıyla kurduğu ilişkiler çok başarılı olmuştur; Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesindeki farklı ülkelerle güvenliğe dayalı çok derin ilişkiler kurulmuştur. Halen 46 ülke düzenli olarak bir araya gelerek güvenlik konularını ele almakta, tatbikat yapmakta ve barışı koruma harekatları düzenlemektedir. Akdeniz Diyaloğuna dahil olan ülkelerin sayısı beşten yediye çıkmıştır. Bu çerçevedeki siyasi tartışmalar daha sık ve yoğun hale gelmiştir. Geçen yıl gerçekleşen terörist saldırıları, hem NATO'nun hem de bütün dünyanın dikkatini Geniş Orta Doğu adı verilen bölgeye çekmiştir. Ayrıca İsrail-Filistin arasındaki anlaşmazlığın büyümesi ve Orta Doğu barış sürecinin bozulması da giderek daha endişe verici bir durum oluşturmaktadır. Akdeniz bölgesindeki dalgalanmalar, güvenliğimizi, ekonomimizi ve Avrupa ve Amerika'daki genel huzur duygusunu etkilemektedir. NATO'nun rollerinden biri de, geniş anlamda Atlantik toplumunun bu tür konulara katılımını sağlamak ve çeşitli uluslararası tarafların çabalarını desteklemektir. Akdeniz Diyaloğunu geliştirmek amacıyla, ortak konularda pratik işbirliğini desteklemek ve kısa sürede somut sonuçlar alabileceğimiz konulara yönelmek makul yaklaşımdır. Örneğin askeri eğitim ve doktrin, savunma reformu ve savunma ekonomisi, terörizm, sınır güvenliği ve acil durumlar gibi konulara odaklanılabilir. Ayrıca Akdeniz Diyaloğunun siyaset ve güvenlikle ilgili görüş alışverişi fırsatlarından daha çok yararlanılabileceğini düşünüyorum. NATO'da "19+7" ve "19+1" adını verdiğimiz, müttefiklerin Akdeniz'deki bütün ortaklarla veya ortaklardan biriyle görüştüğü toplantılar konusunda epeyce deneyim elde ettik. Özellikle 11 Eylül sonrasında çok faydalandığımız bu tür toplantılar devam ettirilmelidir. Aynı zamanda bu diyalog ortamını daha da esnek hale getirmeye çalışmalıyız. Akdeniz'deki ortaklarımızın birbirinden farklı ihtiyaçları olduğunu bilmek ve her birinin kendi ihtiyaçlarını en iyi karşılayacak işbirliği yöntemini belirlemesi önemlidir. Diyalogdan tam olarak katma değer elde edebilmek için, hepimiz açık fikirli olmalıyız. İşbirliğimizi saydam ve çeşitli tarafları sürece dahil edecek biçimde devam ettirmeli ve her zaman başka ülkelerin de katılımına imkan sağlamalıyız. '2015'DE DÜNYA' GELECEĞİN KEHANETİ 2015'te dünyanın karşılaşması muhtemel stratejik ortamı şöyle özetleyebiliriz: Önce kötüler: 1. Gelecekte başta Kafkaslar, Orta Asya, Kuzey Afrika ve Orta Doğu olmak üzere pek çok ülkede istikrarsızlık görülecek. 2. Bu istikrarsızlık sadece meydana geldiği ülke ile sınırlı kalmayıp Avrupa'ya ve başka ülkelere taşacak. 3. Terörizm olayları çoğalacak. 4. Afganistan'da olduğu gibi devlet yapısının yıkıldığı ülkeler çoğalacak 5. Kitle imha silahları yayılacak. İyi olanlar ise: 1. Kazanan demokrasi olacak. Demokrasinin çekiciliği sadece kişiye moral veren bir model olduğu için değil, pragmatik olarak giderek küreselleşen dünya yapısı içinde kişiye kurtulma içgüdüsünü en iyi şekilde kullandırma özelliği taşımasıdır. 2. Teknoloji ilerleyecek. Bilgi teknolojisi, biyoteknoloji ve benzeri yeni teknolojilerin entegre olmasıyla yenilikler çoğalacak ve bundan hem ekonomi hem de halk sağlığı yararlanacak. 3. Avrupa Birliği şimdikinin iki katı büyüklükte, uluslararası kimlikte gerçek bir Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasına sahip bir aktör olacaktır. 4.Son olarak, transatlantik güvenlik ortaklığı, halkanın merkezini teşkil eden ve çok daha büyümüş bir NATO olarak varlığını koruyacaktır. NATO bir askeri teşkilat olarak terörizm, kitle imha silahları ve diğer tehlikelere karşı ülkeleri koruyacaktır. Bununla beraber, 2015'te beklenen tehlikelere karşı savunma yatırımı yapmaya devam etmeliyiz. Askeri kabiliyet, güvenliği sağlamanın gereği olduğu gibi doğrudan politik etkinliği de arttırır. Bu amaçla gelecek için 'doğru' kapasitelere yatırım yapılmalı ve bütçeler kısıtlı bile olsa bunları aşarak hazırlıklı olunmalıdır. Önceki sıkıntılara kıyasla bugün doğru yolda adımlar atılmakta olsa bile savunma endüstrisi dönüşüm süreci uzmanlar vasıtasıyla hızlandırılmalıdır. 2015'te dünya gene zorluklarla karşılaşacaktır fakat şimdiden hazırlıklı olursak bunların hiçbiri aşılamaz olmayacaktır.