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Member of the European Commission Responsible for Enlargement Avrupa Komisyonu Genişlemeden Sorumlu Üyesi The Heads of State and Government of 25 European countries met in Copenhagen to wrap up the negotiations for the enlargement of the European Union in December 2002. As a result, ten new Member States will join the European integration process on 1 May 2004 Solemn speeches have rightly been made about the import of this decision. It is probably comparable only to the historic decision that first set Europe on the road to integration and will have a lasting impact on present and future generations of Europeans. Enlargement finally heals the rift caused by the Second World War, which left the continent split into two opposing blocs. Enlargement brings with it a new political order based, for the first time in modern European history, on common values and a shared desire for harmony and cooperation. The age-old dream of a united Europe is now beginning to take shape. We are leaving behind us the age of wars, hostile neighbours and unequal opportunities that did Europe so much harm. Instead, we will achieve a degree of European unity without precedent in the history of our continent. This historic opportunity was opened up by 1989's historic turnabout in Europe, when millions of central and eastern Europeans finally shook off the yoke of Communist dictatorship and mismanagement and began democratising their societies. The emergence of democracy in central and eastern Europe was moving testimony to the fact that the universal values born in Europe can only temporarily be suppressed by force and that the desire for freedom, democracy and equal opportunities will win through in the end. The collapse of the post-war order placed enlargement on the agenda for European history. It would not have been politically, strategically or morally defensible to continue accepting the limits imposed by the Iron Curtain on European integration and to debar from the building of Europe those countries which had the misfortune to find themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. In many former "Eastern Bloc" countries Communism was an insignificant force when the war ended. Countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and Lithuania would never have joined the Soviet Bloc of their own volition. And the events of 1953 in Berlin, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Prague and 1981 in Poland show that the desire for self-determination never abated. This is why it is impossible to overstate enlargement's historic opportunity, especially for the Federal Republic of Germany, to put right a direct consequence of Germany's policy of aggression and annihilation. Viewed strategically, enlargement stands first and foremost for a policy of peace and stability. I well remember the euphoria of many who saw the end of the Cold War as automatically meaning the beginning of an everlasting peace. In truth, peace and stability in Europe are guaranteed only where Europe is united, and the lack of any prospect of unification revives old conflict patterns and scenarios. The Balkan conflicts and tragedies of the 1990s showed this all too clearly. And they also reminded us that conflicts in Europe always spill over, that the destabilisation of any part of the continent inevitably becomes a threat to the whole. It would, however, be reductive and incorrect to see enlargement as no more than a security measure. It actually offers an opportunity for the majority of European countries to concentrate their forces and determine their own future in an age of globalisation. For enlargement to succeed, people in central and eastern Europe had to embark on a unique transformation of their societies. Modern democracies with the trappings of the rule of law and modern administrations had to be built out of literally nothing, floundering economies had to be restructured into competitive market economies. There were neither textbooks nor experience to draw on, apart from a few parallels with developments in East Germany. Over a relatively short time span most of the future Member States had mastered this process to such an extent that their integration into the European Union became possible. I am absolutely convinced that we western Europeans still do not understand or appreciate just how remarkable the reforms carried out and being carried out by central and eastern European societies actually are. While many people focus on the problems and weaknesses which quite understandably remain in these countries, they often overlook the enormous progress, the courage, the many talents and the unstinting efforts mobilised by these countries every day. This makes it important to reiterate that the future Member States' achievements are largely the result of their own efforts. I am, however, equally convinced that the prospect of EU membership was crucial to the ultimate success of the reform process. The desire to belong ensured that reform fervour did not flag, that the heavy social cost was borne and that the majority of people ignored nationalist or populist voices. And this is why the pace of enlargement has been such a key issue. No society can sustain such an effort without reward and a clearly visible goal. If only for that reason, we could not wait, as some suggested, for the central and eastern European countries to reach the EU's social and economic average. I very much doubt whether this could ever have been achieved without the prospect of enlargement. Opting for rapid enlargement did much to stimulate the development of the candidate countries' economies, generally bringing growth rates that consistently outstripped the EU average. Forecasts for the next ten years suggest that this trend will continue after enlargement. Unsurprisingly, European business has been betting heavily on enlargement from the very outset. Enlargement will not only give the EU the biggest internal market, it will give it a growth market conducive to interchange and innovation. The prospect of enlargement has also given rise to an unprecedented transfer of modern European legislation. The turn towards the EU did not make industrial standards the sole measure of change. Where it existed, European law was integrated into the new legal order that the candidate countries were building. This obviously greatly facilitated the search for the right solution, be it in the matter of environmental or competition law or support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and saved draining internal political struggles. It is no coincidence that other transition countries are now asking our future members for advice and assistance on the best way to dovetail the development of a modern judicial and administrative system into the transition process. The negotiations and our annual progress reports together played a crucial role in accelerating and monitoring the necessary adoption of the Community acquis. At this point I would quickly like to run through the chronology of the negotiations. As you know, negotiations opened with six countries in 1998 and were extended to another six by decision of the Helsinki European Council. At the same time the pace of these negotiations was strictly geared to the progress of individual applicants from 2000 onwards. This meant that countries which otherwise met the accession criteria would not be disadvantaged simply because negotiations had started later. This decision, with that of December 2000 to conduct negotiations on the basis of a roadmap, greatly speeded up negotiations with all candidate countries. The overriding purpose of the roadmap was to avoid negotiating bottlenecks and allow individual negotiating issues to be resolved gradually. The object of the current negotiations was obviously not the Community acquis but the transition arrangements which one side or the other considered necessary for political, economic, social or financial reasons. Such rules are a common way of limiting the conflicts and risks inherent in such a process. And the roadmap did indeed permit the prompt and gradual solution of some very thorny issues, including the free movement of workers or the freedom to acquire farmland and property. Only the most awkward questions, which also touched on the overall financing of enlargement, were held over for the final round of negotiations. This approach enabled the negotiations to be concluded on schedule in Copenhagen. We were dead on target. The Commission played a key role in this, drawing up proposals for the Member States which did not demand too much of either side. At the same time both negotiating parties displayed a high degree of political pragmatism and flexibility, sustaining that approach right up to the Copenhagen European Council. I am persuaded that the ongoing negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania will follow the same pattern. Romania and Bulgaria have still to prove that they are completely ready for accession. It is, however, crystal clear that both countries are part of the ongoing enlargement process and that we have every interest in making sure that they keep to the accession schedules they have set themselves. The Copenhagen summit guaranteed them further support to help them meet the 2007 deadline they have chosen for EU membership. In 2004 we will also have to review Turkey's membership prospects. The country still does not meet the political criterion in practice, even if the prospect of possible EU membership has brought rapid implementation of a number of fundamental reforms that the Community had been harping on about for decades to no avail. I must add that the accession negotiations were not the only challenges facing the EU and the accession countries. There were a good many other stumbling blocks which threatened to overshadow negotiations with individual countries or upset the entire schedule. I am thinking, for example, of the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice. Had the people of Ireland not voted "yes", the schedule could not have maintained; I remain grateful for their resounding vote in favour of enlargement. There was a conflict between the Czech Republic and Austria over the Temelin nuclear power station, which was resolved with Commission mediation. There were attempts to use enlargement for political ends. The EU and Russia had to find a solution to the problems of transit to Kaliningrad which took due account of Lithuania's interests. There were question marks over enlargement policy in various Member States. And, naturally enough, there were elections in many candidate countries in which people were called on to decide whether their country maintained its pro-European course. What counts is that all these hurdles were cleared, not least because, for once, a majority of citizens and political leaders saw eye to eye and defended the view that enlargement was necessary. But there is still work to be done for the enlargement - in the candidate countries and in the EU. The candidate countries will need to push ahead with preparations for accession with vigour and determination. It will need to become apparent in 2003 that the accession Treaty is a good treaty. The European Parliament, national parliaments and people in the accession countries will need to endorse the treaty. Hence my insistence on the need to talk with people, to provide information and to act in response to their concerns. We have good arguments that demonstrate that the pros and cons of the enlargement have been properly weighed up and that the benefits and opportunities far outweigh the risks. But we have to make sure they know that. In some respects, of course, enlargement is a journey into unknown territory - in the course of which we hope to tap the wealth and potential generated by the coming together of 25 Member States, to accept diversity and turn it into a source of common strength. Not least, we will need to make sure, with our institutions and policies, that the EU can function properly on a day-to-day basis without collapsing under its own weight. I would like to deal with that point first. In purely formal terms, the Treaty of Nice created the institutional framework for enlargement. And we would really have dug our heels in if anyone had tried to delay enlargement by undermining the political agreement that Nice represents. That said, the Convention now underway makes two things extremely obvious. First, the Treaty of Nice is, by its very nature, a transitional solution. Apart from anything else, it does not make sense for the rules for cooperation in an EU of over 25 countries to be framed by the current Member States alone. They must be written by all "masters of the treaties", present and future. Second, the Convention is proof that the so-called "old continent" is young enough to strike out in a new direction when it sees a dead end ahead of it. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Nice, it became apparent that a traditional inter-governmental conference would lack the strength to find the comprehensive solutions that are now required. Clearly, the time has come to move beyond just talking about being more democratic, more transparent, and closer to the people, and to start putting the ideas into practice. It would be premature to try to second-guess the outcome of this great reform debate. However, I think there is one truly strategic question at the centre of the Convention's work: is the "Community method", as it is known, a suitable basis to build the future on or do we need to introduce more inter-governmental cooperation? As I far as I can see, there is a large majority, including the representatives of the accession countries, in favour of the essential idea behind the Community method. Basically, they want to maintain the current balance and continue to protect the smaller states against the larger ones. It should come as no surprise that I am a very enthusiastic advocate of the Community method, not because it makes the European Union unique amongst all other international organisations but because it was born out of Europe's history. On top of that, it enables us to make the kind of decisive progress with integration that can only be achieved in political life through compromise, but it does so without reducing everything to the lowest common denominator. In a European Union with 27 Member States, reducing things to the lowest common denominator could easily turn into a zero-sum game. I assume that the Convention will come up with a comprehensive package, which it will present to the Member States as a kind of constitutional treaty. I think the time has come for us to sit down together and work out how to safeguard the values that hold us together. If we look carefully enough, we see that they are already anchored in the existing Treaties. And I also think it is right to spell out more clearly what issues should be dealt with exclusively at European level and what should remain primarily a matter for the individual Member States. At the same time, it is surely wrong to imagine that the outcome of the Convention and the ensuing inter-governmental conference will be the final word in the matter. A balance of vision and pragmatism has long been a feature of the European Union. For that reason, we would do well to get used to the idea that no reform is going to settle matters once and for all in the European Union. All reforms will have to leave some questions unanswered, giving scope for future development. A new Treaty will not dispel the very deep-rooted and growing feeling of alienation amongst the European public towards the European institutions and the decisions they make. There is no doubt that many factors have contributed to this feeling. One of the questions I think we should be asking in this connection is: does the EU take action in the fields that the public expect it to? Surveys show that many people want to see a common European foreign and security policy and or a joint European commitment to fighting international crime - two areas where integration is still in its infancy. At the same time everyone knows of some piece of EU regulation that they think is stupid. Such views may or may not be justified but they seem to be symptomatic. So far, I'm afraid the Convention has not had a lot to say about this problem. But it has to be dealt with; we can't keep putting it off. The financial perspective for the period up to 2013 will have to be settled by 2006 at the latest. Some preliminary decisions have already been taken. Agricultural spending will be stable up to 2013, even for the enlarged Community, producing real savings in the enlarged EU. The resulting changes will strengthen the EU's hand in the current "Doha Round" of WTO negotiations. There will also have to be a review of the affordability and effectiveness of the Structural Funds, the policy area with the second largest budget. This is not meant to be an attack on the notion of solidarity with the new Member States. Those countries in particular will be depending on our support. For me, the object is promote growth, employment and innovation as effectively as possible. This is entirely in line with the Lisbon strategy and it will help to bring the new Member States up to speed as soon as possible. We can and must make enlargement a catalyst for the development of our continent. There is no disputing that enlargement will create a larger area of stability, security and dependable cooperation and that it will confirm the European Union as the centre of gravity in Europe. The EU exerts a strong attraction on its neighbours. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that a further round of enlargement was just around the corner. The EU will need time to settle down after this one first. With the exception of the EFTA states, the Stability-Pact countries that might one day join still have a long way to go before they meet the conditions. Though, of course, there are considerable differences between the situation in Croatia, say, and Albania. And we cannot put up what would amount to a modern-day Hadrian's Wall, reinforcing the dramatic differences in prosperity that already divide Poland and Ukraine, for example. We must take advantage of this enlargement to sort out our relations with our future neighbours to the East and South-East. The fundamental question is how to bring about the positive effects of the prospect of enlargement - without the immediate prospect of enlargement! That question forces us to think again about the received wisdom that membership of the European Union is the only reliable way of uniting the continent. I think we might want to consider developing a form of special partnership covering all Community policy areas. We will have to discuss the details, with the Member States to be, among others. I am convinced that they will be particularly keen to have a say, and put forward their own proposals for a new EU neighbourhood policy, as Poland has long demonstrated. After all, these countries are their immediate neighbours and it is only to be expected that they will want cooperation to be as close as possible to avoid being sidelined, politically and geographically. This discussion is often said to be about drawing "Europe's borders" as if it the final shape of the European Union could be set down in stone, now. I think we would be well advised simply to concentrate on the foreseeable future in which EU membership would not be feasible for either party and to leave everything else to be decided by another generation. In forging intensive relations with our neighbours, we can and should learn from our experience with enlargement. I think it is important to strive for the closest possible cooperation with an approach that adheres to common principles, sets out common goals and establishes clear staging posts on the road to meeting those goals. The preparations for enlargement have shown us that setting goals together, then checking progress at regular intervals, with support from the Community of course, acted as a catalyst for the reform process in those countries. In my view, we also need much more intensive political contact, and day-to-day contact, with our neighbours to foster dialogue and build trust. Enlargement will also effect trans-Atlantic relations. It may even strengthen them. Many of our future Member States have also very close ties with the USA. They retain strong memories of the solidarity America showed them, during the Cold War for example, or when they were applying for NATO membership. As Europeans, we should capitalise on that. America's roots are in Europe. We are getting a new opportunity and we should make the most of it. To do that, though, the EU would need to develop a foreign and security policy and become a player in its own right. Just as we need the US, so it needs the EU as a serious and equal partner. If however, we are riven by internal divisions on foreign and security policy issues, then we run the very serious risk of badly damaging not just the enlarged EU but also trans-Atlantic relations. That would not be in America or Europe's interests. Yirmi beş Avrupa ülkesinin devlet ve hükümet başkanlarının, Aralık 2002'de Kopenhag'da aldıkları karara göre, 1 Mayıs 2004'de Avrupa entegrasyon sürecine on yeni üye ülke dahil olacak. Genişleme sayesinde, Avrupa tarihinde ilk defa ortak değerlere ve uyum ve işbirliği konularında ortak bir arzuya dayalı yeni bir siyasi düzen kurulmaktadır. Birleşik Avrupa hakkındaki tarihsel hayal, şekillenmeye başladı. Avrupa'ya çok zarar vermiş olan savaş, düşman komşular ve eşit olmayan haklara dayalı dönemi artık geride bırakıyoruz ve kıtamızın tarihinde görülmemiş bir düzeyde birlik oluşturuyoruz. Stratejik açıdan birleşme, öncelikle barış ve istikrar politikası anlamına gelmektedir. Aslında Avrupa'da barış ve istikrar sadece Avrupa birleştiğinde teminat altına alınabilir. Genişleme, Avrupa ülkelerinin çoğuna güçlerini birleştirme ve küreselleşme döneminde kendi geleceklerini belirleme imkanı vermektedir. Orta ve Doğu Avrupa'daki halklar, genişlemenin başarılı olması için toplumlarını benzersiz bir biçimde değiştirmeye başladılar. Hukukun üstünlüğüne dayalı ve modern yönetimlerden oluşan modern demokrasilerin sıfırdan oluşturulması gerekti; sallantıda olan ekonomiler, rekabetçi piyasa ekonomileri oluşturacak biçimde yeniden yapılandırıldı. Hiçbir toplum, böylesine bir çabayı ödül ve açıkça görülebilen bir hedef olmadan gerçekleştiremez. Hızlı genişleme yoluna gitmek, aday ülkelerin ekonomilerini hareketlendirme ve büyüme hızlarını AB ortalamasının üstüne çekme yönünde etkili oldu. AB'nin büyümesi sayesinde sadece en büyük iç pazar oluşturulmakla kalmayacak, aynı zamanda değişime ve yeniliğe açık bir pazarın büyümesi de sağlanacak. Ayrıca büyüme imkanı, daha önce görülmemiş bir biçimde modern Avrupa mevzuatının da oluşmasını sağlamıştır. Mevcut Avrupa kanunları, aday ülkelerin oluşturdukları yeni yasal düzene entegre edilmiştir. Bu sayede örneğin çevre veya rekabet hukuku gibi konularda doğru çözümün bulunması kolaylaşmış ve siyaset konusunda yorucu iç çatışmaların yaşanması önlenmiştir. Genişleme, bilinmeyen topraklara yapılan bir seyahattir. Bu süreçte 25 üye ülkenin bir araya gelmesiyle oluşan zenginlik ve potansiyelden yararlanmayı, çeşitliliği kabul etmeyi ve ortak gücümüzün kaynağı haline getirmeyi amaçlıyoruz. |